terça-feira, 24 de maio de 2011

Folha de São Paulo - Lobby

Falta de regra para lobby leva a limiar da ética

Única saída seria a criação de normas claras de ação para que a sociedade entenda quem defende quais interesses

NO BRASIL, CRIA-SE A FALSA IMPRESSÃO DE QUE A NÃO REGULAMENTAÇÃO DO LOBBY IMPEDE TAMBÉM SEUS EFEITOS DANINHOS


CREOMAR LIMA CARVALHO DE SOUZA
ESPECIAL PARA A FOLHA

Sempre que algum novo escândalo político surge no horizonte é reacendida a discussão acerca da necessidade ou não de regulamentação da prática do lobby.
Basicamente, tal terminologia serve para designar a prática de defesa de um determinado interesse particular ou associativo frente aos representantes políticos da população -normalmente os legisladores.
Essa prática, que nasce contemporaneamente com o direito de petição exposto na constituição dos EUA, foi assumindo relevância neste país e em outras democracias à medida que os interesses sociais em jogo na arena política se tornaram mais competitivos entre si.
Nesses termos e em perspectiva comparada, é possível estabelecer algumas diferenças entre esta prática no Brasil e nos EUA.
O principal aspecto aqui é o fato de que, enquanto a sociedade estadunidense compreende o lobby e o regulamenta de forma a dar mais transparência ao processo -via credenciamento dos defensores de interesse e prestação de contas dos valores recebidos por parte dos congressistas-, no Brasil, a prática está fora das luzes do ambiente democrático.
E qual o resultado de tais diferenças de comportamento sobre o tema? Um resultado bastante visível é que nos Estados Unidos a transparência que envolve o processo de lobby fortalece a cultura democrática e fixa no cidadão o direito de peticionar.
Aqui, contrariamente, cria-se a falsa impressão de que não regulamentar a atividade impediria os efeitos daninhos do lobby -fossem eles o tráfico de influência e a cooptação de parlamentares.
O fato é que a não regulamentação abre espaço para ações que se colocam no limiar da legalidade e da ética, tais como as que são observadas com infeliz frequência nos noticiários nacionais.
A única saída plausível a esse processo seria a criação de regras claras de ação e a possibilidade de a sociedade civil entender quem defende quais interesses perante a nação. Isso porque transparência é fundamental em todos os âmbitos da vida democrática.

CREOMAR LIMA CARVALHO DE SOUZA é professor de relações internacionais do Ibmec, mestre pela UnB (Universidade de Brasília) e especialista em política externa dos EUA pela Universidade da Flórida.

quinta-feira, 19 de maio de 2011

The Nation - Obama and the Middle East

Obama Gives Major Middle East Speech—But Is the Region Still Listening?

Robert Dreyfuss
May 19, 2011


The Middle East that President Obama addressed today is rapidly spinning out of the American orbit. With the possible exception of Jordan’s King Abdullah, a docile monarch, none of the other leaders in the region pay much attention to what the United States wants or needs. Not only do they not respond to American diktat, they barely listen when the United States begs, pleads, and cajoles them.

Consider the roster: Pakistan openly defies the United States, and its leaders recently visited Afghanistan to urge Kabul to break with Washington and join a new alignment with Pakistan and China. Afghanistan’s government, though dependent on U.S. support, flouts U.S. demands with impunity, and President Karzai has openly accused the United States of trying to dominate Central Asia. Iran, despite onerous sanctions and repeated threats of U.S. military action, has not only refused to compromise over its nuclear program, but Tehran is supporting anti-American movements in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Gulf states. Iraq, whose very government is the creation of the U.S. invasion in 2003, has all but shut the door on a continued U.S. military presence there, and its leadership touts its new alliance with Iran. Saudi Arabia, where anti-American sentiment has been growing for a decade, is seething over U.S. policy in the region, and Riyadh is reaching out to Beijing, Moscow, and other powers, despite its overwhelming dependence on weapons and security assistance from Washington. Israel, under Bibi Netanyahu, gleefully defies American pressure to halt its expansion into the occupied West Bank. The Palestinian National Authority, under President Abbas, has all but broken with the United States by forging a deal with Hamas and by short-circuiting the U.S.-led peace process and going to the United Nations for ratification of its statehood. And the new, emerging governments of Egypt and Tunisia owe nothing to the United States. Egypt, in particular, is reaching out to Iran.

Yet, in introducing Obama at the State Department, Secretary of State Clinton said, “America’s leadership is more essential than ever,” and she stressed the “indispensable role our country can and must play.” Unfortunately, Obama continued that theme.

To be sure, Obama acknowledged that the protests that are sweeping the region could unleash a form of populism that could strengthen the Arab world’s resolve to confront Israel’s expansionism and to demand that Israel, and its supporters in the United States, take the necessary steps to settle the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. As Obama put it: A region undergoing profound change will lead to populism in which millions of people
– not just a few leaders – must believe peace is possible.” Though he wasn’t being explicit, Obama was using that message as a warning to Israel that, as he said, “The status quo is unsustainable.” Certainly, in Palestine, Egypt, and elsewhere, democratic change and elections will catapult into power people and political forces who, unlike deposed President Mubarak in Egypt, won’t so easily tolerate Israel’s refusal to live within the borders of 1967. Unfortunately, although Obama outlined, in his speech, his rough vision for what a settlement might look like, and although he said that he disagrees with the notion that the peace process is dead, he failed to provide any path from here to there. (By all accounts, his refusal to put forward an American plan for Middle East peace was in deference to the influence of Dennis Ross, the principal White House Middle East adviser, over the wishes of the State Department and, presumably, the Defense Department, too.) And Obama put most of the onus for a deal on the Palestinians, saying that the recent Fatah-Hamas accord had complicated matters and that it was the Palestinians, not Israel, that has to get its house in order first. Not only that, but he disparaged the Palestinian plan to go to the United Nations in September to win its endorsement of an independent state, an action that Obama called “symbolic,” and he warned that “we will stand against attempts to single [Israel] out for criticism in international forums.”

In his litany of praise for democratic change in the region, Obama did not mention democracy in Palestine, where voters in a free election voted for Hamas, and although he did not call Hamas a “terrorist” group, he pointedly refrained from suggesting that the United States might open a dialogue with them.

In discussing the outbreak of popular revolts, Obama said – perhaps in a sideways slap at the U.S. intelligence community – that the Arab spring “should not have come as a surprise.” (No doubt, it was a surprise to the White House.) He praised the fact that a “new generation has emerged,” tech savvy and aware. And, usefully, he acknowledged that the people of region mistrust the United States, given decades of history in which the United States has supported forces of reaction and viewed the region as a big oil well that needs American protection.

Yet Obama tried to fit a bunch of square pegs into round holes, lumping Egypt and Tunisia (allies whose leaders were toppled), Libya, Syria and Iran (adversaries where leaders have used violence against rebels), and Yemen and Bahrain (where allied authoritarian leaders have used force against demands for regime change). Yet the U.S. approach in all of these situations has not fit nicely into a pattern. Though Obama spoke of an overarching principle (“It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region”), no overarching principle is evident, so far at least. The United States was slow to throw its support behind Egyptian rebels, yet quick to slap sanctions on Syria’s government, though hundreds of protesters were killed in both places. Quick to intervene militarily in Libya, in support of rebels there, Obama has so far backed the government of Bahrain that used military force to crush a rebellion by majority Shia. Nothing in Obama’s speech clarified these gaps, which are hypocritical at best and, at worst, just the same old application of cold, calculating national interest foreign policy that has guided U.S. policy in the region since the Cold War.

At the start of his speech, Obama tried to put U.S. policy in the framework of shift. He is, he said, winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, with the killing of Osama bin Laden, the threat from Al Qaeda has received a “huge blow.” Perhaps he wants credit in the region for unwinding the Bush administration reckless policy, which declared war on a mythical alliance that included Al Qaeda, Iraq, the Taliban, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood. But unless he takes far stronger steps, in July, to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, unless he acts more forcefully to draw down the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and in vast arms sales to the region, and unless he drags Israel kicking and screaming to the bargaining table, his speech will have been for naught. And the democratic movement in the Middle East, meanwhile, will hum along happily without him.

Robert Dreyfuss
In his Middle East speech today, addressing the political changes sweeping the region, President Obama said, “The question for us is: What role will America play?” Although he declared that he will approach that question with “humility,” and although he noted that “it is not America that put people into the streets of Tunis and Cairo,” the president’s address, and the remarks of Hillary Clinton before him, indicate clearly that the Obama administration has yet come to grips with the fact that the Middle East is no longer a region in which the United States is playing the central role.

The Middle East that President Obama addressed today is rapidly spinning out of the American orbit. With the possible exception of Jordan’s King Abdullah, a docile monarch, none of the other leaders in the region pay much attention to what the United States wants or needs. Not only do they not respond to American diktat, they barely listen when the United States begs, pleads, and cajoles them.

Consider the roster: Pakistan openly defies the United States, and its leaders recently visited Afghanistan to urge Kabul to break with Washington and join a new alignment with Pakistan and China. Afghanistan’s government, though dependent on U.S. support, flouts U.S. demands with impunity, and President Karzai has openly accused the United States of trying to dominate Central Asia. Iran, despite onerous sanctions and repeated threats of U.S. military action, has not only refused to compromise over its nuclear program, but Tehran is supporting anti-American movements in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Gulf states. Iraq, whose very government is the creation of the U.S. invasion in 2003, has all but shut the door on a continued U.S. military presence there, and its leadership touts its new alliance with Iran. Saudi Arabia, where anti-American sentiment has been growing for a decade, is seething over U.S. policy in the region, and Riyadh is reaching out to Beijing, Moscow, and other powers, despite its overwhelming dependence on weapons and security assistance from Washington. Israel, under Bibi Netanyahu, gleefully defies American pressure to halt its expansion into the occupied West Bank. The Palestinian National Authority, under President Abbas, has all but broken with the United States by forging a deal with Hamas and by short-circuiting the U.S.-led peace process and going to the United Nations for ratification of its statehood. And the new, emerging governments of Egypt and Tunisia owe nothing to the United States. Egypt, in particular, is reaching out to Iran.

Yet, in introducing Obama at the State Department, Secretary of State Clinton said, “America’s leadership is more essential than ever,” and she stressed the “indispensable role our country can and must play.” Unfortunately, Obama continued that theme.

To be sure, Obama acknowledged that the protests that are sweeping the region could unleash a form of populism that could strengthen the Arab world’s resolve to confront Israel’s expansionism and to demand that Israel, and its supporters in the United States, take the necessary steps to settle the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. As Obama put it: A region undergoing profound change will lead to populism in which millions of people
– not just a few leaders – must believe peace is possible.” Though he wasn’t being explicit, Obama was using that message as a warning to Israel that, as he said, “The status quo is unsustainable.” Certainly, in Palestine, Egypt, and elsewhere, democratic change and elections will catapult into power people and political forces who, unlike deposed President Mubarak in Egypt, won’t so easily tolerate Israel’s refusal to live within the borders of 1967. Unfortunately, although Obama outlined, in his speech, his rough vision for what a settlement might look like, and although he said that he disagrees with the notion that the peace process is dead, he failed to provide any path from here to there. (By all accounts, his refusal to put forward an American plan for Middle East peace was in deference to the influence of Dennis Ross, the principal White House Middle East adviser, over the wishes of the State Department and, presumably, the Defense Department, too.) And Obama put most of the onus for a deal on the Palestinians, saying that the recent Fatah-Hamas accord had complicated matters and that it was the Palestinians, not Israel, that has to get its house in order first. Not only that, but he disparaged the Palestinian plan to go to the United Nations in September to win its endorsement of an independent state, an action that Obama called “symbolic,” and he warned that “we will stand against attempts to single [Israel] out for criticism in international forums.”

In his litany of praise for democratic change in the region, Obama did not mention democracy in Palestine, where voters in a free election voted for Hamas, and although he did not call Hamas a “terrorist” group, he pointedly refrained from suggesting that the United States might open a dialogue with them.

In discussing the outbreak of popular revolts, Obama said – perhaps in a sideways slap at the U.S. intelligence community – that the Arab spring “should not have come as a surprise.” (No doubt, it was a surprise to the White House.) He praised the fact that a “new generation has emerged,” tech savvy and aware. And, usefully, he acknowledged that the people of region mistrust the United States, given decades of history in which the United States has supported forces of reaction and viewed the region as a big oil well that needs American protection.

Yet Obama tried to fit a bunch of square pegs into round holes, lumping Egypt and Tunisia (allies whose leaders were toppled), Libya, Syria and Iran (adversaries where leaders have used violence against rebels), and Yemen and Bahrain (where allied authoritarian leaders have used force against demands for regime change). Yet the U.S. approach in all of these situations has not fit nicely into a pattern. Though Obama spoke of an overarching principle (“It will be the policy of the United States to promote reform across the region”), no overarching principle is evident, so far at least. The United States was slow to throw its support behind Egyptian rebels, yet quick to slap sanctions on Syria’s government, though hundreds of protesters were killed in both places. Quick to intervene militarily in Libya, in support of rebels there, Obama has so far backed the government of Bahrain that used military force to crush a rebellion by majority Shia. Nothing in Obama’s speech clarified these gaps, which are hypocritical at best and, at worst, just the same old application of cold, calculating national interest foreign policy that has guided U.S. policy in the region since the Cold War.

At the start of his speech, Obama tried to put U.S. policy in the framework of shift. He is, he said, winding down the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, with the killing of Osama bin Laden, the threat from Al Qaeda has received a “huge blow.” Perhaps he wants credit in the region for unwinding the Bush administration reckless policy, which declared war on a mythical alliance that included Al Qaeda, Iraq, the Taliban, Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood. But unless he takes far stronger steps, in July, to withdraw forces from Afghanistan, unless he acts more forcefully to draw down the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and in vast arms sales to the region, and unless he drags Israel kicking and screaming to the bargaining table, his speech will have been for naught. And the democratic movement in the Middle East, meanwhile, will hum along happily without him.

segunda-feira, 16 de maio de 2011

The New York Times - Blackwater in Middle East

Secret Desert Force Set Up by Blackwater’s Founder

By MARK MAZZETTI and EMILY B. HAGER




ABU DHABI, United Arab Emirates — Late one night last November, a plane carrying dozens of Colombian men touched down in this glittering seaside capital. Whisked through customs by an Emirati intelligence officer, the group boarded an unmarked bus and drove roughly 20 miles to a windswept military complex in the desert sand.

The Colombians had entered the United Arab Emirates posing as construction workers. In fact, they were soldiers for a secret American-led mercenary army being built by Erik Prince, the billionaire founder of Blackwater Worldwide, with $529 million from the oil-soaked sheikdom.

Mr. Prince, who resettled here last year after his security business faced mounting legal problems in the United States, was hired by the crown prince of Abu Dhabi to put together an 800-member battalion of foreign troops for the U.A.E., according to former employees on the project, American officials and corporate documents obtained by The New York Times.

The force is intended to conduct special operations missions inside and outside the country, defend oil pipelines and skyscrapers from terrorist attacks and put down internal revolts, the documents show. Such troops could be deployed if the Emirates faced unrest in their crowded labor camps or were challenged by pro-democracy protests like those sweeping the Arab world this year.

The U.A.E.’s rulers, viewing their own military as inadequate, also hope that the troops could blunt the regional aggression of Iran, the country’s biggest foe, the former employees said. The training camp, located on a sprawling Emirati base called Zayed Military City, is hidden behind concrete walls laced with barbed wire. Photographs show rows of identical yellow temporary buildings, used for barracks and mess halls, and a motor pool, which houses Humvees and fuel trucks. The Colombians, along with South African and other foreign troops, are trained by retired American soldiers and veterans of the German and British special operations units and the French Foreign Legion, according to the former employees and American officials.

In outsourcing critical parts of their defense to mercenaries — the soldiers of choice for medieval kings, Italian Renaissance dukes and African dictators — the Emiratis have begun a new era in the boom in wartime contracting that began after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. And by relying on a force largely created by Americans, they have introduced a volatile element in an already combustible region where the United States is widely viewed with suspicion.

The United Arab Emirates — an autocracy with the sheen of a progressive, modern state — are closely allied with the United States, and American officials indicated that the battalion program had some support in Washington.

“The gulf countries, and the U.A.E. in particular, don’t have a lot of military experience. It would make sense if they looked outside their borders for help,” said one Obama administration official who knew of the operation. “They might want to show that they are not to be messed with.”

Still, it is not clear whether the project has the United States’ official blessing. Legal experts and government officials said some of those involved with the battalion might be breaking federal laws that prohibit American citizens from training foreign troops if they did not secure a license from the State Department.

Mark C. Toner, a spokesman for the department, would not confirm whether Mr. Prince’s company had obtained such a license, but he said the department was investigating to see if the training effort was in violation of American laws. Mr. Toner pointed out that Blackwater (which renamed itself Xe Services ) paid $42 million in fines last year for training foreign troops in Jordan and other countries over the years.

The U.A.E.’s ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, declined to comment for this article. A spokesman for Mr. Prince also did not comment.

For Mr. Prince, the foreign battalion is a bold attempt at reinvention. He is hoping to build an empire in the desert, far from the trial lawyers, Congressional investigators and Justice Department officials he is convinced worked in league to portray Blackwater as reckless. He sold the company last year, but in April, a federal appeals court reopened the case against four Blackwater guards accused of killing 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in 2007.

To help fulfill his ambitions, Mr. Prince’s new company, Reflex Responses, obtained another multimillion-dollar contract to protect a string of planned nuclear power plants and to provide cybersecurity. He hopes to earn billions more, the former employees said, by assembling additional battalions of Latin American troops for the Emiratis and opening a giant complex where his company can train troops for other governments.





Knowing that his ventures are magnets for controversy, Mr. Prince has masked his involvement with the mercenary battalion. His name is not included on contracts and most other corporate documents, and company insiders have at times tried to hide his identity by referring to him by the code name “Kingfish.” But three former employees, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of confidentiality agreements, and two people involved in security contracting described Mr. Prince’s central role.

The former employees said that in recruiting the Colombians and others from halfway around the world, Mr. Prince’s subordinates were following his strict rule: hire no Muslims.

Muslim soldiers, Mr. Prince warned, could not be counted on to kill fellow Muslims.

A Lucrative Deal

Last spring, as waiters in the lobby of the Park Arjaan by Rotana Hotel passed by carrying cups of Turkish coffee, a small team of Blackwater and American military veterans huddled over plans for the foreign battalion. Armed with a black suitcase stuffed with several hundred thousand dollars’ worth of dirhams, the local currency, they began paying the first bills.

The company, often called R2, was licensed last March with 51 percent local ownership, a typical arrangement in the Emirates. It received about $21 million in start-up capital from the U.A.E., the former employees said.

Mr. Prince made the deal with Sheik Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates. The two men had known each other for several years, and it was the prince’s idea to build a foreign commando force for his country.

Savvy and pro-Western, the prince was educated at the Sandhurst military academy in Britain and formed close ties with American military officials. He is also one of the region’s staunchest hawks on Iran and is skeptical that his giant neighbor across the Strait of Hormuz will give up its nuclear program.

“He sees the logic of war dominating the region, and this thinking explains his near-obsessive efforts to build up his armed forces,” said a November 2009 cable from the American Embassy in Abu Dhabi that was obtained by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks.

For Mr. Prince, a 41-year-old former member of the Navy Seals, the battalion was an opportunity to turn vision into reality. At Blackwater, which had collected billions of dollars in security contracts from the United States government, he had hoped to build an army for hire that could be deployed to crisis zones in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. He even had proposed that the Central Intelligence Agency use his company for special operations missions around the globe, but to no avail. In Abu Dhabi, which he praised in an Emirati newspaper interview last year for its “pro-business” climate, he got another chance.

Mr. Prince’s exploits, both real and rumored, are the subject of fevered discussions in the private security world. He has worked with the Emirati government on various ventures in the past year, including an operation using South African mercenaries to train Somalis to fight pirates. There was talk, too, that he was hatching a scheme last year to cap the Icelandic volcano then spewing ash across Northern Europe.

The team in the hotel lobby was led by Ricky Chambers, known as C. T., a former agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation who had worked for Mr. Prince for years; most recently, he had run a program training Afghan troops for a Blackwater subsidiary called Paravant.

He was among the half-dozen or so Americans who would serve as top managers of the project, receiving nearly $300,000 in annual compensation. Mr. Chambers and Mr. Prince soon began quietly luring American contractors from Afghanistan, Iraq and other danger spots with pay packages that topped out at more than $200,000 a year, according to a budget document. Many of those who signed on as trainers — which eventually included more than 40 veteran American, European and South African commandos — did not know of Mr. Prince’s involvement, the former employees said.



He and Mr. Prince also began looking for soldiers. They lined up Thor Global Enterprises, a company on the Caribbean island of Tortola specializing in “placing foreign servicemen in private security positions overseas,” according to a contract signed last May. The recruits would be paid about $150 a day.

Within months, large tracts of desert were bulldozed and barracks constructed. The Emirates were to provide weapons and equipment for the mercenary force, supplying everything from M-16 rifles to mortars, Leatherman knives to Land Rovers. They agreed to buy parachutes, motorcycles, rucksacks — and 24,000 pairs of socks.

To keep a low profile, Mr. Prince rarely visited the camp or a cluster of luxury villas near the Abu Dhabi airport, where R2 executives and Emirati military officers fine-tune the training schedules and arrange weapons deliveries for the battalion, former employees said. He would show up, they said, in an office suite at the DAS Tower — a skyscraper just steps from Abu Dhabi’s Corniche beach, where sunbathers lounge as cigarette boats and water scooters whiz by. Staff members there manage a number of companies that the former employees say are carrying out secret work for the Emirati government.

Emirati law prohibits disclosure of incorporation records for businesses, which typically list company officers, but it does require them to post company names on offices and storefronts. Over the past year, the sign outside the suite has changed at least twice — it now says Assurance Management Consulting.

While the documents — including contracts, budget sheets and blueprints — obtained by The Times do not mention Mr. Prince, the former employees said he negotiated the U.A.E. deal. Corporate documents describe the battalion’s possible tasks: intelligence gathering, urban combat, the securing of nuclear and radioactive materials, humanitarian missions and special operations “to destroy enemy personnel and equipment.”

One document describes “crowd-control operations” where the crowd “is not armed with firearms but does pose a risk using improvised weapons (clubs and stones).”

People involved in the project and American officials said that the Emiratis were interested in deploying the battalion to respond to terrorist attacks and put down uprisings inside the country’s sprawling labor camps, which house the Pakistanis, Filipinos and other foreigners who make up the bulk of the country’s work force. The foreign military force was planned months before the so-called Arab Spring revolts that many experts believe are unlikely to spread to the U.A.E. Iran was a particular concern.

An Eye on Iran

Although there was no expectation that the mercenary troops would be used for a stealth attack on Iran, Emirati officials talked of using them for a possible maritime and air assault to reclaim a chain of islands, mostly uninhabited, in the Persian Gulf that are the subject of a dispute between Iran and the U.A.E., the former employees said. Iran has sent military forces to at least one of the islands, Abu Musa, and Emirati officials have long been eager to retake the islands and tap their potential oil reserves.

The Emirates have a small military that includes army, air force and naval units as well as a small special operations contingent, which served in Afghanistan, but over all, their forces are considered inexperienced.

In recent years, the Emirati government has showered American defense companies with billions of dollars to help strengthen the country’s security. A company run by Richard A. Clarke, a former counterterrorism adviser during the Clinton and Bush administrations, has won several lucrative contracts to advise the U.A.E. on how to protect its infrastructure.

Some security consultants believe that Mr. Prince’s efforts to bolster the Emirates’ defenses against an Iranian threat might yield some benefits for the American government, which shares the U.A.E.’s concern about creeping Iranian influence in the region.

“As much as Erik Prince is a pariah in the United States, he may be just what the doctor ordered in the U.A.E.,” said an American security consultant with knowledge of R2’s work.

The contract includes a one-paragraph legal and ethics policy noting that R2 should institute accountability and disciplinary procedures. “The overall goal,” the contract states, “is to ensure that the team members supporting this effort continuously cast the program in a professional and moral light that will hold up to a level of media scrutiny.”

But former employees said that R2’s leaders never directly grappled with some fundamental questions about the operation. International laws governing private armies and mercenaries are murky, but would the Americans overseeing the training of a foreign army on foreign soil be breaking United States law?

Susan Kovarovics, an international trade lawyer who advises companies about export controls, said that because Reflex Responses was an Emirati company it might not need State Department authorization for its activities.

But she said that any Americans working on the project might run legal risks if they did not get government approval to participate in training the foreign troops.

Basic operational issues, too, were not addressed, the former employees said. What were the battalion’s rules of engagement? What if civilians were killed during an operation? And could a Latin American commando force deployed in the Middle East really be kept a secret?

Imported Soldiers

The first waves of mercenaries began arriving last summer. Among them was a 13-year veteran of Colombia’s National Police force named Calixto Rincón, 42, who joined the operation with hopes of providing for his family and seeing a new part of the world.

“We were practically an army for the Emirates,” Mr. Rincón, now back in Bogotá, Colombia, said in an interview. “They wanted people who had a lot of experience in countries with conflicts, like Colombia.”

Mr. Rincón’s visa carried a special stamp from the U.A.E. military intelligence branch, which is overseeing the entire project, that allowed him to move through customs and immigration without being questioned.

He soon found himself in the midst of the camp’s daily routines, which mirrored those of American military training. “We would get up at 5 a.m. and we would start physical exercises,” Mr. Rincón said. His assignment included manual labor at the expanding complex, he said. Other former employees said the troops — outfitted in Emirati military uniforms — were split into companies to work on basic infantry maneuvers, learn navigation skills and practice sniper training.

R2 spends roughly $9 million per month maintaining the battalion, which includes expenditures for employee salaries, ammunition and wages for dozens of domestic workers who cook meals, wash clothes and clean the camp, a former employee said. Mr. Rincón said that he and his companions never wanted for anything, and that their American leaders even arranged to have a chef travel from Colombia to make traditional soups.

But the secrecy of the project has sometimes created a prisonlike environment. “We didn’t have permission to even look through the door,” Mr. Rincón said. “We were only allowed outside for our morning jog, and all we could see was sand everywhere.”

The Emirates wanted the troops to be ready to deploy just weeks after stepping off the plane, but it quickly became clear that the Colombians’ military skills fell far below expectations. “Some of these kids couldn’t hit the broad side of a barn,” said a former employee. Other recruits admitted to never having fired a weapon.

Rethinking Roles

As a result, the veteran American and foreign commandos training the battalion have had to rethink their roles. They had planned to act only as “advisers” during missions — meaning they would not fire weapons — but over time, they realized that they would have to fight side by side with their troops, former officials said.

Making matters worse, the recruitment pipeline began drying up. Former employees said that Thor struggled to sign up, and keep, enough men on the ground. Mr. Rincón developed a hernia and was forced to return to Colombia, while others were dismissed from the program for drug use or poor conduct.

And R2’s own corporate leadership has also been in flux. Mr. Chambers, who helped develop the project, left after several months. A handful of other top executives, some of them former Blackwater employees, have been hired, then fired within weeks.

To bolster the force, R2 recruited a platoon of South African mercenaries, including some veterans of Executive Outcomes, a South African company notorious for staging coup attempts or suppressing rebellions against African strongmen in the 1990s. The platoon was to function as a quick-reaction force, American officials and former employees said, and began training for a practice mission: a terrorist attack on the Burj Khalifa skyscraper in Dubai, the world’s tallest building. They would secure the situation before quietly handing over control to Emirati troops.

But by last November, the battalion was officially behind schedule. The original goal was for the 800-man force to be ready by March 31; recently, former employees said, the battalion’s size was reduced to about 580 men.

Emirati military officials had promised that if this first battalion was a success, they would pay for an entire brigade of several thousand men. The new contracts would be worth billions, and would help with Mr. Prince’s next big project: a desert training complex for foreign troops patterned after Blackwater’s compound in Moyock, N.C. But before moving ahead, U.A.E. military officials have insisted that the battalion prove itself in a “real world mission.”

That has yet to happen. So far, the Latin American troops have been taken off the base only to shop and for occasional entertainment.

On a recent spring night though, after months stationed in the desert, they boarded an unmarked bus and were driven to hotels in central Dubai, a former employee said. There, some R2 executives had arranged for them to spend the evening with prostitutes.

Mark Mazzetti reported from Abu Dhabi and Washington, and Emily B. Hager from New York. Jenny Carolina González and Simon Romero contributed reporting from Bogotá, Colombia. Kitty Bennett contributed research from Washington.

sexta-feira, 13 de maio de 2011

Folha de São Paulo - Oriente Médio.

Terrorismo, islã e a democracia árabe
HUSSEIN ALI KALOUT

Os atentados terroristas da Al Qaeda constituem o maior desserviço que Bin Laden poderia prestar ao mundo islâmico e ao mundo árabe


A morte de Osama bin Laden, líder da rede de terrorismo Al Qaeda, representa o cumprimento de um objetivo político com forte sentido simbólico para a sociedade global, em especial para a norte-americana. A estrutura piramidal da Al Qaeda, com Bin Laden no cume, foi sendo desmantelada e fragmentada em células autônomas e desorganizadas, que estão espalhadas pelo mundo muçulmano.
A paralisia da organização decorre, em boa medida, do rastreamento e do bloqueio dos recursos financeiros da rede, o que limitou sua capacidade operacional.
Entretanto, a problemática do terrorismo internacional não se equaciona na eliminação de Bin Laden. Sua morte não levará ao fim do fundamentalismo islâmico.
A emergência do extremismo e do radicalismo no mundo muçulmano é oriunda da pobreza, da exclusão e da marginalização social.
Por outro lado, os atentados terroristas da Al Qaeda pelo mundo constituíram-se no maior desserviço que Bin Laden poderia prestar ao mundo islâmico de forma geral e ao mundo árabe em particular.
Um estudo da Academia Militar em West Point (EUA) revela um dado importante: entre 2004 e 2008, 85% dos atentados terroristas foram realizados em territórios de países islâmicos. E as principais vítimas do terror fundamentalista foram os próprios muçulmanos.
As recentes revoluções em prol da democracia nos países árabes marcaram o declínio da filosofia política da Al Qaeda e o fracasso do extremismo fundamentalista.
Da Tunísia à Síria, passando por Egito, Iêmen, Líbia e Bahrein, observa-se um movimento pela democracia e pela laicidade do Estado. A revolução no mundo árabe está calcada na luta pelas liberdades civis e de imprensa, na justiça social, no combate à corrupção e no fim das ditaduras hereditárias.
A luta democrática é caminho sem volta. A geração de jovens árabes exige um novo paradigma e está cansada de retóricas vazias e infundadas. O que demonstra que, ao contrário do pensamento ocidental de outrora, é possível combater o radicalismo islâmico sem a conivência com regimes totalitários.
Nas revoluções pró-democracia em países árabes não se viu invocada em nenhum momento a figura do Bin Laden. Seus simpatizantes não passam de minorias fanáticas que usam e comercializam a religião islâmica conforme suas conveniências. A morte de Bin Laden não vai repercutir na lógica das revoluções democráticas árabes, tampouco alterará a dinâmica do conflito israelo-palestino.
Os impactos principais se concentrarão em duas frentes: primeiro, na reação do extremismo islâmico no Afeganistão, no Paquistão e no Iraque; segundo, no cenário político-eleitoral nos Estados Unidos.
O presidente Barack Obama assegurou sua candidatura à reeleição. Os republicanos não possuem projeto político claro nem uma figura notável para liderar o partido nas eleições presidenciais em 2012. A menos que surjam fatos inusitados, o cenário está definido.
Contudo, em torno dessa operação apresentam-se fatores preocupantes. O primeiro deles concerne às celebrações da morte do terrorista -uma provocação desnecessária e perigosa, que pode incitar o revanchismo dos radicais islâmicos. O segundo diz respeito à legalidade da ação à luz dos dispositivos do direito internacional público e do direito internacional humanitário.
A credibilidade política dessa operação exaure-se na atuação do governo americano, pautada pela tortura de presos, pela invasão da soberania de uma nação e pela execução sem direito a julgamento do terrorista. Por mais nefastos que tenham sido os seus crimes.

quinta-feira, 12 de maio de 2011

El Pais - Artigo de Joseph Nye

El poder americano después de Bin Laden

JOSEPH S. NYE


Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a professor at Harvard University and the author of The Future of Power.

Cuando un Estado es preponderante en cuanto a recursos de poder, los observadores hablan con frecuencia de que se encuentra en una situación hegemónica. En la actualidad, muchos expertos sostienen que el poder en ascenso de otros países y la pérdida de influencia estadounidense en un Oriente Próximo revolucionario indican una decadencia de la "hegemonía americana", pero este término es confuso. Para empezar, la posesión de recursos de poder no siempre entraña que se consigan los resultados deseados. Ni siquiera la reciente muerte de Osama Bin Laden a manos de fuerzas especiales de Estados Unidos indica nada sobre el poder americano en un sentido o en otro.



Para entender por qué, piénsese en la situación posterior a la II Guerra Mundial, en la que correspondía a EE UU una tercera parte del producto mundial y este país tenía una preponderancia abrumadora en cuanto a armas nucleares. Muchos lo consideraban un hegemón mundial. No obstante, Estados Unidos no pudo impedir la "pérdida" de China, "hacer retroceder" el comunismo en la Europa Oriental, impedir el punto muerto en la guerra de Corea, derrotar al Frente de Liberación Nacional de Vietnam ni desalojar al régimen de Castro de Cuba.

Incluso en la época de la supuesta hegemonía americana, los estudios muestran que solo una quinta parte de las medidas adoptadas por Estados Unidos para imponer cambios en otros países mediante amenazas militares dieron resultado, mientras que las sanciones económicas solo lo hicieron en la mitad de los casos. Aun así, muchos creen que la preponderancia actual de Estados Unidos en cuanto a recursos de poder es hegemónica y que decaerá, como ocurrió antes con la de Gran Bretaña. Algunos americanos tienen una reacción emocional ante esa perspectiva, pese a que sería ahistórico creer que Estados Unidos tendrá eternamente una participación preponderante en los recursos de poder.

Pero el término "decadencia" aúna dos dimensiones diferentes del poder: una decadencia absoluta, en el sentido de declive o pérdida de la capacidad para utilizar los recursos propios eficazmente, y una decadencia relativa, en la que los recursos de poder de otros Estados lleguen a ser mayores o a utilizarse más eficazmente. Por ejemplo, en el siglo XVII los Países Bajos prosperaron internamente, pero decayeron en poder relativo, pues otros cobraron mayor fuerza. A la inversa, el Imperio Romano occidental no sucumbió ante otro Estado, sino por su decadencia interna y a consecuencia de los embates de tropeles de bárbaros. Roma era una sociedad agraria con poca productividad económica y un alto grado de luchas intestinas.

Si bien Estados Unidos tiene problemas, no encaja en la descripción de decadencia absoluta de la antigua Roma y, por popular que sea, la analogía con la decadencia británica es igualmente engañosa. Gran Bretaña tenía un imperio en el que nunca se ponía el sol, gobernaba a más de una cuarta parte de la humanidad y gozaba de la supremacía naval, pero hay diferencias muy importantes entre los recursos de poder de la Gran Bretaña imperial y los Estados Unidos contemporáneos. Durante la I Guerra Mundial, Gran Bretaña ocupaba tan solo el cuarto puesto entre las grandes potencias en cuanto a personal militar, el cuarto por el PIB y el tercero en gasto militar. Los gastos de Defensa ascendían por término medio a entre el 2,5% y el 3,4% del PIB y el Imperio estaba gobernado en gran parte con tropas locales.

En 1914, las exportaciones netas de capital de Gran Bretaña le brindaron un importante fondo financiero al que recurrir (aunque algunos historiadores consideran que habría sido mejor haber invertido ese dinero en industria nacional). De los 8,6 millones de soldados británicos que combatieron en la I Guerra Mundial, casi una tercera parte procedían del imperio de allende los mares.

Sin embargo, con el ascenso del nacionalismo, a Londres leresultó cada vez más difícil declarar la guerra en nombre del Imperio, cuya defensa llegó a ser una carga más pesada. En cambio, Estados Unidos ha tenido una economía continental inmune a la desintegración nacionalista desde 1865. Pese a lo mucho que se habla a la ligera del imperio americano, Estados Unidos está menos atado y tiene más grados de libertad que la que disfrutó Gran Bretaña jamás. De hecho, la posición geopolítica de Estados Unidos difiere profundamente de la de la Gran Bretaña imperial: mientras que esta última había de afrontar a unos vecinos en ascenso en Alemania y en Rusia, Estados Unidos se beneficia de los dos océanos y de unos vecinos más débiles.

Pese a esas diferencias, los estadounidenses son propensos a creer cíclicamente en la decadencia. Los Padres Fundadores se preocupaban por las comparaciones con la decadencia de la República de Roma. Además, el pesimismo cultural es muy americano y se remonta a las raíces puritanas del país. Como observó Charles Dickens hace un siglo y medio, "de creer a sus ciudadanos, como un solo hombre, están siempre deprimidos, siempre estancados y siempre son presa de una crisis alarmante y nunca ha dejado de ser así".

Más recientemente, las encuestas de opinión revelaron una creencia generalizada en la decadencia después de que la Unión Soviética lanzara el Sputnik en 1957 y otra vez durante las sacudidas económicas de la época de Nixon en la década de 1970 y después de los déficits presupuestarios de Ronald Reagan en la de 1980. Al final de aquel decenio, los americanos creían que el país estaba en decadencia; aun así, al cabo de una década creían que Estados Unidos era la única superpotencia. Ahora muchos han vuelto a creer en la decadencia.

Los ciclos de preocupación por la decadencia nos revelan más sobre la psicología americana que sobre los cambios subyacentes en cuanto a recursos de poder. Algunos observadores, como, por ejemplo, el historiador de Harvard Niall Ferguson, creen que "debatir sobre las fases de la decadencia puede ser una pérdida de tiempo: lo que debería preocupar más a las autoridades y los ciudadanos es una inesperada caída en picado". Ferguson cree que una duplicación de la deuda pública en el próximo decenio no puede por sí sola erosionar la fuerza de Estados Unidos, pero podría debilitar la fe, durante mucho tiempo dada por supuesta, en la capacidad de Estados Unidos para capear cualquier crisis.

Ferguson está en lo cierto al sostener que Estados Unidos tendrá que abordar su déficit presupuestario para mantener la confianza internacional, pero, como muestro en mi libro El futuro del poder, lograrlo entra dentro de lo posible. Estados Unidos disfrutó de un superávit presupuestario hace solo una década, antes de que las reducciones fiscales de George W. Bush, dos guerras y la recesión crearan una inestabilidad fiscal. La economía estadounidense sigue ocupando uno de los primeros puestos en competitividad, según el Foro Económico Mundial, y el sistema político, a su desorganizado modo, ha empezado a lidiar con los cambios necesarios.

Algunos creen que antes de las elecciones de 2012 se podría lograr una avenencia política entre republicanos y demócratas; otros sostienen que es más probable un acuerdo después de las elecciones. En cualquier caso, las declaraciones difusas sobre una decadencia de la hegemonía resultarían una vez más engañosas.

terça-feira, 3 de maio de 2011

Site R7 - Obama e a morte de Bin Laden

Obama é o grande vencedor com a morte de Bin Laden
Morte do terrorista pode ajudar reeleição do presidente dos EUA, em 2012

Maurício Moraes, do R7



Em apenas um dia, Obama viu sua popularidade disparar; há uma semana, presidente teve de provar que havia nascido nos Estados Unidos



Há uma semana, a Casa Branca teve de divulgar a certidão de nascimento de Barack Obama, para responder setores conservadores que acusavam o presidente de não ser americano. Dias depois, Obama é o grande líder do país, que conseguiu, dez anos após os ataques do 11 de Setembro, matar seu inimigo número 1, Osama bin Laden. A explosão de patriotismo devolve orgulho aos americanos e pode ser a chave para a reeleição do presidente, no ano que vem.

Tanto Heni Ozi Cukier, da ESPM (SP), quanto Creomar Lima Carvalho de Souza, do IBMEC (Brasília), ambos professores de relações internacionais, concordam que Obama é o “grande vencedor” da operação que matou Bin Laden, neste domingo (1º), em sua casa nos arredores de Islamabad, no Paquistão.

Para Cukier, além de Obama, o “povo americano também será beneficiado”.

- O 11 de Setembro, a guerra no Iraque e no Afeganistão e a crise econômica derrubaram a autoestima dos americanos. A morte de Bin Laden eleva a autoestima e os americanos voltam a se ver como líderes e vencedores.

Carvalho de Souza diz que Obama “recebeu um abacaxi da mão dos republicanos”.

- Recebeu duas guerras, uma imagem negativa dos EUA, a crise econômica. E próximo do ciclo eleitoral, Bin Laden está morto. Isso faz com que Obama tenha uma carta na manga para as eleições.

Aprovação de Obama dispara

Antes do anúncio da morte de Bin Laden, apenas 17% dos americanos consideravam favoravelmente a atuação de Obama como comandante-em-chefe das Forças Armadas e líder em questões de segurança nacional. Sua popularidade, de modo geral, estava em 41% - ponto mais baixo desde o pico de 62%, em 2009.

Mas, já na tarde de segunda-feira (2), a primeira pesquisa sobre os mesmos quesitos mostravam níveis favoráveis de 76% em termos amplos, com 77% de aprovação no item “segurança nacional”.

Al Qaeda deve reagir

Segundo Cukier, a morte de Bin Laden “não afeta o coração operacional da Al Qaeda. Mas tem um impacto simbólico muito forte”.

- O lado simbólico é importante, porque o terrorismo não visa conquistar um território, mas sim usar o medo para atingir seus objetivos.

Bin Laden era a principal referência da rede terrorista Al Qaeda, que espalhou células por várias partes do mundo.
Carvalho de Souza alerta, no entanto, que a rede terrorista irá reagir.

- Uma parte da militância da Al Qaeda está de luto. De outro lado, a morte também estimula o movimento “agora é hora de dar o troco”. Alguma reação ocorrerá, qual o tamanho e como isso ocorrerá, não se sabe.

Paquistão é o grande problema

Tanto Cukier quanto Carvalho de Souza ressaltam que o Paquistão se torna, agora, o centro das preocupações sobre a segurança internacional.

Apesar de ser um aliado histórico dos EUA, o Paquistão não é um regime confiável para os americanos, tanto que a operação que matou Bin Laden não foi comunicada com antecedência ao governo paquistanês.

Nesta segunda-feira (2), o assessor para segurança interna de Obama, John Brennan, informou que os EUA vão investigar a eventual colaboração paquistanesa a Bin Laden.

domingo, 1 de maio de 2011

Pensando o Jornalismo e a Democracia - Jessica Macêdo

Jornalismo, violência e democracia – objeto e papéis sociais

Jéssica Macêdo

Ao longo dos últimos dez anos, diversos casos de violência estiveram na pauta midiática por tempo além do necessário para apenas divulgar o fato. Análises e conceitos tem participado da cobertura dos acontecimentos como algo complementar daquela informação. Seria esta a abordagem correta das tragédias contemporâneas?

Podemos dizer que os veículos de comunicação tem caminhado para o rumo correto, mas o atual modelo passa longe de ser o ideal. É importante lembrar que já foi bem pior, quando o papel da imprensa em casos de violência se resumia em dar apelidos a bandidos e incentivar a violência como resposta à violência. Como no caso, em 1964, do bandido “Cara-de-cavalo” (apelido dado pelo imprensa), que dentre muitas manchetes de jornais incitando a violência, a última do Última Hora (Rio de Janeiro) foi “Cara-de-cavalo: os bandidos morrem assim”, fazendo referência à morte de cara-de-cavalo alvejado por dezenas de tiros aos 23 anos de idade.

Sobre a abordagem da imprensa policial e especificamente sobre o caso “Cara-de-cavalo”, o repórter policial Luarlindo Ernesto, que trabalhou muitos anos na editoria de polícia do Jornal do Brasil, fez algumas declarações em entrevista ao livro Reportagem policial (Faculdade da Cidade, 1998), dentre elas, uma que mostra o quanto as mistificações realizadas pela imprensa, ainda que sem querer, podem encobrir o real retrato da violência social e policial:

“Foi um mito construído pela imprensa, um bandido muquirana, tinha uma mulher na zona, assaltava ponto de bicho em Vila Isabel e fumava uma maconhazinha, não era um bandido de expressão. O azar dele foi que o banqueiro de bicho chamou os amigos policiais e pediu para eles darem um sumiço no cara. Os policiais foram dar uma dura e, naquela afobação de prendê-lo, um policial matou um colega. Botaram a culpa no Cara de Cavalo e isso motivou uma caçada implacável ao jovem bandido, que tinha apenas 23 anos. (....)”


Essa construção mitológica de bandidos, aparentemente, chegou ao fim. Deu espaço a um jornalismo mais factual que ainda precisa de ajustes. Trazer apenas o factual para a pauta acarreta em adotar formas exaustivas de torná-lo interessante. A mídia tem ido com muita sede ao pote, motivada pelas manifestações pessoais de aceitação da população em geral. Quanto mais os espectadores consumirem esse tipo de informação, por mais tempo ela será explorada pelos veículos.

A violência está por toda parte. Segundo o Ministério da Saúde, por exemplo, a cada 10 horas uma criança é assassinada no Brasil, o que corresponde a mais de cinco mil mortes de crianças até 14 anos de idade nos últimos seis anos. A mídia divulga todas essas mortes? É notório que não. A violência que pauta a mídia é aquela que atinge da classe média alta para cima ou grandes proporções dramáticas e comoção, como o caso Realengo, por exemplo.

É nisso que a mídia falha, dentre outras coisas. No seu papel social. Ao invés de promover o incentivo ao combate à violência, ela trata o tema pontual de acordo com o seu interesse de audiência. Por mais que se afirme que os veículos tem papel de informantes do fato, eles também são formadores de opinião, responsáveis também pelo agendamento de políticas públicas.

Sempre que se trata um caso isolado dando destaque ao contexto social, alguma coisa muda. É preciso investigar, informar o fato e trazer para o debate maneiras de evitar e melhorar esse contexto social. Atualmente, os especialistas que tratam do assunto junto à mídia, tem visão tão limitada quanto os veículos. Geralmente, são fontes policiais que sabem apenas do seu papel e do seu próprio contexto.

O ministério público e o ministério da saúde também tem informações importantíssimas a respeito da violência como um todo, que se debatidas junto com a sociedade, poderiam ser construtoras de novas políticas de combate à violência e de conscientização social. Segundo pesquisa realizada durante a elaboração do livro “Mídia e violência – novas tendências na cobertura de criminalidade e segurança no Brasil” de autoria de Silvia Ramos e Anabela Paiva, 83,7% dos textos analisados em jornais de circulação nacional eram motivados por fatos cotidianos (assaltos, homicídios, acidentes) e apenas 6,1% traziam matérias de inciativa da imprensa para debater assuntos a respeito da segurança-pública.

Informações como estas mostram que de fato a abordagem midiática da violência evoluiu, mas ainda é muito deficiente no papel social que ela tem junto a sociedade e governos. O progresso é comprometido quando só se debate segurança-pública quando alguma tragédia acontece. Temos de evitá-la e não esperá-la acontecer para se tomar alguma providencia. Atitude que cabe tanto aos governantes quanto à mídia. A sociedade é espelho das atitudes de quem os dirige e vice-versa. Democracia é isso, o individual dá espaço ao coletivo. Todos participam respeitando seus papéis sociais.

*Jéssica Macêdo é jornalista, entusiasta dos estudos dos papéis e efeitos da mídia na sociedade contemporânea. Twitter: @lambujja Blog: http://lambujja.com.br